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The financial markets appeared to have weathered recent storms which dominated the financial 
landscapes in 2019 – namely trade wars, which spanned from retaliatory tariffs to currency 
devaluations – as well as impending imposition of digital sales taxes which even threatened to 
escalate retaliatory tariff wars even further. Reductions in interest and federal funds rates – 
unprecedented and surprising moves by the Federal Reserve, as first instigated in August 2019 to 
address anticipated global uncertainties – the first federal rate cuts since 2008, had left investors 
in a divided state of opinions. Partly because the rate adjustments had been considered 
unjustified. 
 
However as 2020 has revealed and demonstrated, the financial markets are yet to experience 
greater levels of uncertainty and volatility in the light of the corona virus (COVID-19) outbreak 
– as it increasingly becomes evident that the real impact – and even the true extent of the cases 
remains, to a larger extent, unknown. A clearer picture of the real costs and possible impending 
consequences of the outbreak (as well as failures to disclose real figures of underlying cases) will 
revealed, it appears, in the second half of 2020.  
 
By then, the progress made in respect of addressing the outbreak – particularly in those strategic 
economic sectors which have impacted global trade and growth could be more reasonably 
evaluated. Even though it is fair to say that an effective cure cannot be diagnosed for a problem – 
about which little or limited information is known, it is also fair to say that serious problems of 
disclosure and transparency about the real figures, potential threats have also contributed to the 
levels of uncertainty which have destabilized global financial markets. Thus it is also fair to say 
that a reason why financial markets are particularly sensitive to news about the corona virus, 
relates to the current levels of uncertainty, data, knowledge and information about the potential 
spread and effects of the virus. 
 
Whether the outbreak has reached its peak – or more importantly, when and how it will do so, 
remains an unanswered question. From recent reports, the COVID 19 has generated far reaching 
economic repercussions in the least unexpected areas – in terms of geographical location from 
the outbreak sources. With the exception of the Antarctica, every other continent now has a 
confirmed case – the most recent being Brazil (South America). 
 
Hence the impending challenges become even clearer. Not only is this a global problem – but 
also an issue of how respective regions and countries will be able to address and contain the risks 
emanating from contagion – as well as the availability of resources and facilities to address such 
risks.  
The financial markets have regained grounds following losses in recent weeks. However the 
current global outlook remains largely uncertain. The decision of the Federal Reserve to 
announce its emergency rate cut on the 3rd March 2020, the first since the Financial Crisis, sent 
shock waves amongst investors with the Dow tumbling nearly 1,000 points following what was 
regarded as the “surprising” announcement . Even though stocks have fluctuated in recent weeks, 
stock markets have rebound since the Tuesday announcement. 
 
Recent events have demonstrated the importance of engaging technologies and techniques to 
address matters of global significance – particularly those which impact economically, socially 
and environmentally, in a holistic and futuristic manner – taking into account the interests of 
future generations. 
 
Humanity and global relationships are shaped and defined, not just through the manner in which 
global issues are addressed, but the techniques and responsibilities towards others, at a global 
level also, in deploying such techniques. 
 
 
        Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD 
         March 2020 
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CONFLICT FRAMING, MULTILATERAL LEADERSHIP, AND COALITION  
FORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES, 1995-2011 
 
ABSTRACT 
 We examine how conflict framing and multilateral leadership influence coalition formation 
among World Trade Organization (WTO) member nations. We hypothesize that complainants’ framing of 
alleged violations and leadership in global governance affects WTO members’ propensity to form 
coalitions by joining disputes as third parties. After introducing new measures for quantifying framing 
and leadership, we analyze 308 product-related trade disputes (1995-2011). We find economically 
significant effects for framing and leadership on the likelihood that trading partners join disputes and on 
the chances of reaching negotiated or litigated settlements. We discuss scholarly, managerial, and policy 
implications for forming coalitions and resolving disputes. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: dispute resolution; trade flows; governance; framing; coalitions
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INTRODUCTION 
The production of goods in the global economy is increasingly characterized by the geographic 
dispersion of business activities within and across multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Buckley & Hashai, 
2004; Luo, 2007; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). While the geographic distribution of research and 
development (R&D) units and manufacturing operations enables MNEs to utilize unique local resources, 
it also heightens MNEs’ exposure to country-specific risks (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2005; Miller, 1993). 
Thus, for MNE managers, understanding the external factors that influence strategic risk management is 
paramount for sustaining competitive advantage and improving firm performance (Miller, 1992). Recent 
unexpected events such as the impending “Brexit” withdrawal of the UK from the European Union (EU), 
the collapse of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the rapid escalation of US tariffs on 
products from China, reflect a growing public backlash and a major shift in government policies against 
the forces of globalization (Akhter, 2004). In particular, there appears to be rising economic uncertainty 
about the possible expansion of free trade agreements and polarizing political tensions over the 
appropriate role of national and supranational institutions in resolving trade disputes (Kandogan & Hiller, 
2018). In this context, MNEs face a remarkably unpredictable and unsettling environment for making 
strategic decisions. Amidst this environmental turbulence, the functioning of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as a global multilateral institution faces greater questioning and scrutiny by its 
member nations (Doh, McGuire, & Ozaki, 2015). Our study is based on the premise that countries’ 
participation in the WTO as disputants or third parties provides MNEs with critical information for 
potentially reducing uncertainty and mitigating risks. 
Resolving trade disputes is a core activity of the WTO, and the organization manages one of the 
most active dispute settlement mechanisms in the world. Since 1995, WTO members initiated over 500 
disputes, with over 350 rulings issued.1 The administration of disputes is entrusted to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), whose representatives span all 164 WTO member nations. The WTO DSB 
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operates under two distinct foundational principles.2 First, although international trade is conducted 
mainly at the firm level, trade dispute resolution is performed only at the country level between 
complainant and respondent countries. Second, although disputes typically involve bilateral trade 
relationships, third parties (countries other than the complainant and respondent), may also join disputes 
to offer their own input on economic impacts and interests. Thus, for MNEs, whether it affects inter-firm 
exports or imports, or the intra-firm flow of goods, an unresolved trade dispute may be problematic and 
disruptive. We argue that, in these situations, the WTO may be a source of meaningful predictive data 
about which member countries beyond the complainant and the respondent are likely to become involved 
in a given dispute. Transparent public disclosure of this information by the WTO may enable MNEs to 
anticipate, plan, and adapt to the occurrence of trade disputes by making decisions and taking actions that 
mitigate the perceived risks of these disputes (Melin, 1992).  
Unlike prior research on the WTO DSB, which examines member nations’ propensity for 
initiating or settling disputes as complainants or respondents (Bown, 2005; A. Guzman & Simmons, 
2002; Horn, Mavroidis, & Nordström, 1999; Reinhardt, 2000), our study explores members’ propensity to 
join these disputes as third parties. Given the increasing geographic dispersion of inter- and intra-firm 
production networks, it is essential for MNE managers to evaluate the full range of countries and 
coalitions that may be involved in and affected by a dispute (Boddewyn, 2016). For example, as 
explained in the excerpt below, conflict framing is an essential part of trade dispute negotiations and may 
help disputants form useful temporary coalitions with interested third parties (Odell & Sell, 2006).  
“In a world of bounded rationality, much of the negotiation process is a contest of 
partisans trying to establish the dominant frame of reference. The more a weak-state 
coalition can do to prevail in this subjective contest, the larger its gains are likely to be 
… But generally which arguments will prove to be persuasive, under which conditions?” 
(Odell & Sell, 2006: 23-24) 
The public information embedded in the complainant’s official framing of the conflict within the 
WTO may be a useful tool for MNE managers as they consider ways to handle the risks arising out of a 
                                                                                                              
2
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm 
 4 
trade dispute, even if the ultimate outcome of the dispute is uncertain in its timing and the result. Our 
study aims to address this gap in the existing literature on conflict framing and coalition formation among 
trading partners by contributing new theory, methods, and empirical findings. Our investigation of WTO 
members’ propensity to join disputes as third parties is based on the idea that building coalitions is a 
critical element of resolving disputes. We posit two key mechanisms that may influence WTO members’ 
propensity to join disputes as third parties: conflict framing and multilateral leadership. We hypothesize 
about how complainants’ framing of the nature of  respondents’ alleged violations of WTO policies, and 
the perceived importance, risk, and urgency of disputes affects members’ propensity to join disputes as 
third parties. We also hypothesize about how members’ engagement in the general global governance 
activities of the WTO and in the existing negotiating coalitions within the WTO affects members’ 
propensity to join disputes as third parties. 
Our research contributes to the literature on international trade dispute resolution, global 
governance, multilateral organizations, and its implications for MNE risk management strategies, in three 
main ways. First, we extend existing theory on bilateral trade relations to account for temporary coalition 
formation as part of the dispute negotiation process. Unlike prior research, which examines dyads of 
complainant and respondent countries, we explore potential and actual triads of third party trading 
partner, complainant, and respondent countries. By establishing a theoretical basis for predicting the 
formation of these triads, our research provides scholars, MNE managers, and policymakers with an 
approach for evaluating the wider impact of the dispute and for formulating new strategies and tactics in 
response. Second, based on our proposed extension to existing theory, we hypothesize and empirically 
test conflict framing and multilateral leadership as two possible mechanisms that affect coalition 
formation in trade disputes. We believe that our research may be among the first large-scale analyses of 
the entire at-risk set of trading partner countries that may seek to join product-related trade disputes. We 
introduce new measures to systematically capture and quantify various observable dimensions of conflict 
framing and multilateral leadership and demonstrate their use in our research design. The ability to 
estimate the probability that the countries associated with specific products will join a WTO dispute, may 
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be useful for MNE managers to incorporate in their predictive analytics for strategic risk management. 
Third, our findings indicate that critical aspects of conflict framing and multilateral leadership have 
economically significant effects on the likelihood that a trading partner joins a dispute. Our post hoc 
analyses indicate that framing and leadership also have economically significant effects on the outcomes 
of disputes in terms of remaining in consultations or negotiating or litigating a settlement. 
WTO DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS, AND AN EXAMPLE 
In contrast to civil litigation, the design of the WTO DSB encourages disputant countries to 
discuss their problems and settle their disputes by themselves. The WTO DSB stipulates a minimum 15-
day period of private negotiation between the trade partners, before the complainant may request to enter 
the consultation phase (for a detailed explanation of the entire process, see Kim (1999)).  There are three 
types of participants in WTO trade disputes: complainants, respondents, and third parties. The 
complainant initiates a dispute based on the occurrence of an alleged violation of a trade agreement.3 The 
complainant frames the nature of the conflict by filing a request for consultation (RFC) or official brief 
describing the dispute. The respondent country is the alleged violator against whom the complaint is filed. 
Third parties are other WTO member countries, such as the respondent’s trading partners, that have 
economic interests in the dispute. Once in the consultation phase, the complainant may unilaterally 
request, after a minimum of 60 days, for a panel to be formed. Before making this request, and within the 
first within 10 days of the consultation phase, other WTO member countries have the option of joining 
the dispute as third parties. Any member of the WTO may request to join a dispute as a third-party, 
subject to the approval of the respondent. In nearly all cases, respondents allow affected countries to join 
as third parties, since this potentially prevents the filing of additional, separate disputes by the third 
parties against the same respondent. Thus, permitting interested WTO members to join as third parties 
may be a means for the respondent to consolidate their defensive effort and resources instead of having to 
                                                                                                              
3 If a member discovers that its market access rights were violated by another member, it may initiate a dispute by requesting 
bilateral consultations under Article 4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
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battle multiple members on similar disputes concurrently. Third parties have the opportunity to submit to 
the DSB panel written comments that are considered in the panel’s final report adjudicating the dispute. 
A complainant’s decision to request a panel is a critical point as it marks an escalation of the 
dispute. This has the effect of increasing the direct cost of administering the proceedings as well as the 
opportunity cost of using legal resources. From the perspective of MNE managers, when disputes reach 
this stage, there may be potential repercussions for the locations where the MNE operates. Since panels 
typically conclude within 6 months after the complainants request their formation,4 the progression of a 
dispute to the panel stage may increase time pressure on MNEs to handle the strategic risks associated 
with the dispute. Frequent dispute escalation may harm the reputation of participant countries, particularly 
the name-and-shame effect of a WTO-adjudicated outcome relative to a settlement of inconsistencies 
when negotiated between the countries (Schwartz & Sykes, 2002). Even though third parties are 
presumably more likely to join disputes when the expected benefits exceed the expected litigation costs, 
there exists considerable heterogeneity in WTO members’ willingness to join disputes (Bown, 2005).  
For example, we refer to dispute (DS 202) titled United States – Safeguard on Circular Welded 
Pipe from Korea.5 The complainant, South Korea, alleged that the respondent, the US, implemented a 
WTO-inconsistent safeguard policy that unfairly restricted the trading of welded pipes. The EU and Japan 
joined as third parties. However, other trading partners, such as South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela, 
decided not to participate. This raises the key question of whether there are systematic reasons and 
observable characteristics of disputes and disputants that may reliably predict the likelihood of trading 
partners joining a dispute. In this example, MNEs operating as global factories (Buckley, 2009; 2011, 
2015) in the production of steel pipes may experience greater environmental uncertainty after the decision 
of the EU and Japan to join the dispute. Hence, managers of steel producers face the challenge of 
managing the worldwide risks arising from the initiation and escalation of a bilateral dispute. 
 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
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While recent literature suggests that there is no effect of country size on the likelihood of filing 
disputes (Horn, et al., 1999), prior work suggests that countries lacking in legal infrastructure and 
litigation capabilities are less likely to file disputes (A. T. Guzman & Simmons, 2005). Democracies are 
more likely to initiate and be targets of disputes (Reinhardt, 2000). WTO members are less likely to file 
disputes when they fear retaliation by trading partners, especially in highly interdependent bilateral 
relationships (Blonigen & Bown, 2003). There is initial evidence that large exporters are more likely to 
initiate as well as join dispute consultations as third parties (Bown, 2005).  
Beyond identifying ex-ante factors that drive dispute initiation, prior research examines members’ 
propensity to settle (which is the preferred outcome in the design of the WTO DSB). An important insight 
from this stream of work is the emphasis on the positioning of the complainant’s dispute. The key idea is 
that complainants that are more successful in negotiating settlements with respondents appear to leverage 
the pre-panel consultation stage of the WTO to create credible threats against respondents (Busch & 
Reinhardt, 2003). Here, the threat of an adverse ruling against the respondent, rather than the ruling itself, 
is often the most effective lever for reaching a negotiated settlement (Reinhardt, 2001). However, since a 
negotiated settlement requires significant give and take, complainants tend to frame disputes broadly with 
extensive claims as bargaining leverage (A. T. Guzman & Simmons, 2005). 
From our evaluation of earlier studies on WTO members’ propensity to settle, we identify two 
types of predictors: the nature of the dispute itself and the nature of the disputants. Our central premise is 
that the formation of temporary coalitions with third parties may enhance complainants’ credibility in 
establishing the relevance of the dispute to the WTO as a whole and thereby increase the threat of adverse 
rulings against respondents. We now elaborate on the characteristics of disputes (conflict framing) and 
disputants (multilateral leadership) as predictors of the likelihood of a trading partner joining a dispute.  
Conflict Framing 
 We assume that complainants attempt to frame trade conflicts in ways that enhance their leverage 
in obtaining favorable outcomes. We identify several factors that may be critical in determining trading 
partners’ decisions to join disputes. We focus on the allegation, importance, risk, and urgency of the 
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dispute. Legal scholars argue that prevailing in a dispute is a matter of “telling a good story” (Verheij & 
Bex, 2009). A good story is one where the narrator’s arguments are anchored in plausible evidence 
(Wagenaar, Van Koppen, & Crombag, 1993), and clearly convey the alleged violations. Thus, the 
complainant’s framing of the dispute narrative may fundamentally influence how much the complainant 
may need to engage in the WTO DSB. Dispute characteristics that are more relevant to the respondent’s 
other trading partners are more likely to attract third parties to join the dispute. The conflict narrative is 
equally important for MNEs as it allows managers the first opportunity to evaluate the uncertainty 
generated by the dispute and orchestrate a response (Tihanyi, Devinney, Pedersen, & Venzin, 2014). 
Alleged New Import Restriction 
 The complainant’s framing of a dispute, in terms of specifying the alleged import restrictions, 
shapes how the respondent’s trading partners perceive the relevance of the dispute. If the complainant’s 
allegations focus on a new import violation that deviates from recent trade agreements, then the 
respondent’s other trading partners may also fear the imposition of similar restrictions on their exports. 
This may also influence MNE managers to delay making major risk management decisions by adopting a 
wait-and-see approach, in case favorable outcomes are possible in the future (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). 
WTO members that are direct trading partners of the respondent have the opportunity to form a temporary 
coalition with the complainant by joining the dispute and offering complementary information assets  
(Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) to enhance the impact of the dispute.  
For example, in a dispute (DS 110) Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, a complaint lodged by 
the EU against Chile for imposing higher taxes on imported alcohol, the EU alleged that Chile imposed a 
new import restriction.6 Four third parties joined the dispute: Canada, Peru, the US, and Mexico. The EU 
ultimately requested panel formation and the dispute was settled by arbitration. In another example, in a 
dispute (DS 74) Philippines – Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry, the US complained against the 
Philippines’ practice of both delaying permits to access in-quota amounts of imported pork as well as the 
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practice of granting such permits.7 The case was settled by mutual negotiation. In the RFC filed, the US 
did not allege that the Philippines imposed new import restrictions and no members joined as third party 
participants. Based on the preceding logic and examples, we propose H1: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). A trading partner is more likely to join dispute consultations as a third party 
if the complainant alleges that the respondent applied a new import restriction. 
Alleged Most Favored Nation (MFN) Policy Change 
The MFN principle is the cornerstone of the WTO’s multilateral trading system. The premise is 
that market access is not determined by economic clout, but with the guarantees of a rules-based 
framework (Bown, 2002). The main idea is that the best market access conditions that are conceded to 
one country must automatically be extended to all participants in the system. This prevents large countries 
from leveraging their negotiating power to tilt away from maintaining a level playing field (Bagwell & 
Staiger, 2002). That said, the WTO allows member countries to adjust market entry and participation to 
sector-specific objectives and constraints that are credible, subject to six specific restrictions laid out in 
the provisions by WTO. Members are also allowed commitments and tariff concessions with trading 
partners, if these are justified and meet the restrictions required as laid out in Articles XI, XII, and XIV of 
the WTO.8 Thus, if an MFN policy change inconsistently or selectively applies national treatment 
conditions to certain countries, it is less likely to be impactful and relevant for all of the respondent’s 
trading partners, who, in turn, are less likely to join the dispute. However, if the complainant claims that 
the respondent globally applied the policy change to all of its trading partners, then WTO members are 
more likely to join the dispute as third parties. For MNEs, a dispute framed around an MFN policy 
change could result in costly modifications to operations in foreign markets, including reversing previous 
decisions, in response to not achieving strategic goals (Clarke & Liesch, 2017). 
In EC – Regime for the Importation of Bananas (DS 361), Colombia alleged that the EU unfairly 
levied a tariff only on bananas imported from Colombia.9 Because the complainant claimed that the 
                                                                                                              
7
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds74_e.htm  
8
 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
9
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds361_e.htm  
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respondent partially or selectively applied the policy change only to Colombia, no other WTO members 
joined the dispute as third parties. In contrast, in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (DS 283), Thailand 
alleged that the EU inconsistently applied import restrictions in ways that would affect all sugar 
exporters.10 Here, because the complainant claimed that the respondent globally applied the policy change 
to all of its trading partners, 25 different third party countries joined the dispute, including several 
developing countries and the US. Based on the above rationale and examples, we propose H2: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A trading partner is less likely to join dispute consultations as a third party if 
the complainant alleges that the respondent applied an MFN policy change. 
Dispute Importance  
 Complainants that are highly dependent on international trade are more likely to request panel 
formation, in anticipation of preferring a clear ruling for the dispute matter, rather than attempting a 
negotiated settlement (A. Guzman & Simmons, 2002). The impact of disputes on complainants and 
respondents increases with increasing interdependence of the countries. When the dispute is framed as 
one of high importance, the attention on resolving the dispute may be heightened because of the increased 
economic damage that the respondent’s alleged violations may cause. For MNEs, increased dispute 
importance amplifies the uncertainty that the organization must now manage. This may create instability 
in production networks that reduces performance (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).  
In an example of a dispute (DS 296) US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semiconductors, South Korea filed a complaint against the US about the 
imposition of countervailing duties on DRAM memory chip imports into the US. Semiconductor 
manufacturing is a major industry in South Korea, which is highly dependent on the US as its largest 
market.11 The case moved on through the panel process to be settled in arbitration (DS 296). Four major 
trading partners of the US ––– China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), the EU and Japan ––– which are all 
global major exporters of DRAM memory chips, joined the dispute. Hence, we propose H3: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). The greater the perceived importance of the dispute to a trading partner, the 
more likely the partner is to join consultations as a third party. 
Dispute Risk 
 Dispute risk is the idea that a dispute will result in economic losses for the complainant. Disputes 
with high perceived levels of risk are more likely to cause significant economic damage to complainants 
if not resolved in their favor (Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber, & Spiegel, 1990). For the MNE, as dispute risk 
increases, the political hazards of operating in a country increase (Henisz, 2000). In these situations, 
MNEs may need to consider the trade-offs in exiting the location versus continuing to operate through a 
local partner. If the matter of the dispute is of particular national importance, a complainant that is 
expecting a favorable ruling by a panel is more likely to escalate to the WTO DSB and unlikely to enter 
into negotiation with the respondent, which may require some give and take. If the respondent’s other 
trading partners, who also have an interest in the dispute, similarly anticipate a favorable outcome for the 
complainant, these partners of the respondent are more likely to join the dispute.  
For instance, in the dispute US – Large Civil Aircraft (DS 353) the EU complained that the US 
government was providing subsidies to producers of large civil aircraft.12 Five interested trading partners 
of the US ––– Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and South Korea ––– joined the dispute. Since aircraft 
production is a matter of national interest to the US and the EU (France), the EU, as the complainant, 
moved to request panel formation and a ruling was delivered in its favor. Hence, we propose H4: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The greater the perceived risk of the dispute to a trading partner, the more 
likely the partner is to join consultations as a third party. 
Dispute Urgency 
 Temporal focus is based on the notion that people differ in their perceptions of the value of time 
and these differences drive individual, team and organizational performance outcomes (Gevers, 
Mohammed, & Baytalskaya, 2015; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014). In resolving trade disputes, expressing a 
sense of urgency in the exposition of the RFC document, may enable a complainant to trigger articles that 
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escalate the dispute to demand immediate action through the WTO DSB. Since the premise of requesting 
a panel, as opposed to negotiating a settlement, is the expectation of an outright favorable judgement for 
the complainant, trading partners of the respondent are likely to join the dispute. MNEs in industries with 
perishable goods are more likely to be sensitive to such disputes. In affected locations, MNEs may have 
few alternatives to incurring significant losses if exiting is infeasible. 
As an example, in a dispute (DS 22) Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, the 
Philippines filed a complaint against Brazil for its decision to impose countervailing duties on imports of 
desiccated coconuts.13 The high urgency of the dispute is based on the perishable nature of the product. 
Five of Brazil’s trading partners ––– Canada, the EU, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the US ––– all joined the 
dispute. The complainant then requested panel formation, and ultimately the respondent was required to 
adopt the measures recommended by the appellate body. Thus, we propose H5: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The greater the perceived urgency of the dispute to a trading partner, the 
more likely the partner is to join consultations as a third party. 
Multilateral Leadership 
Because countries have to coexist and engage in trade with each other long after a dispute is over, 
reputation is an important resource for dispute participants. Prior research in organizational theory 
suggests that reputation is a key resource that impacts performance (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & 
Sever, 2005). Several mechanisms for reputation are identified as predictors of alliance formation, 
including: status arising from network centrality (Stuart, 1998), trustworthiness (Stuart, 1998), and 
familiarity from serving similar markets (Coff, 1999). Reputation may also aid organizations that operate 
in volatile environments (Gao, Zuzul, Jones, & Khanna, 2017). When the emergence of trade disputes 
adversely affects the reputations of disputant countries, MNE managers may choose to de-integrate their 
operations from these countries to protect their firms until the uncertainty is resolved (Zhao, 2006).  
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 Trading partners. Third parties may shape the impact and relevance of a given dispute, by 
providing pertinent information to inform a panel in arriving at their judgement. To the extent that trading 
partners engage in the general global governance activities of the WTO and in the existing negotiating 
coalitions within the WTO, we argue that these partners are more likely to join disputes as third parties. 
Serving in a WTO leadership capacity provides countries with greater power and influence. Participating 
in WTO negotiating groups also helps countries align their economic and geopolitical interests in formal 
coalitions with like-minded countries. Both of these aspects of multilateral leadership may enhance a 
country’s reputation within the WTO. We contend that WTO member countries with stronger reputations 
for multilateral leadership, are more likely to be perceived as credible sources of information regarding 
disputes and are therefore more likely to join these disputes. Hence, we propose H6a: 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a). The greater a trading partner’s involvement in multilateral leadership in 
the WTO, the more likely it is to join dispute consultations as a third party. 
Complainants. Within the WTO DSB, panels are required to make objective assessments of the 
matters before them, including the essential facts and the applicability of and conformity with pertinent 
agreements (Bown, 2002). Panels aim to present findings in the dispute that help the DSB conclusively 
adjudicate the dispute. Complainants that serve in leadership positions and participate in negotiation 
groups in the WTO, may enjoy higher status, and be viewed more favorably by WTO members than 
countries that are less involved in multilateral leadership. In such situations, there is a powerful incentive 
for the trading partners of the respondent to leverage the complainant’s status to obtain an outcome that 
decreases the likelihood of the trading partner encountering a similar issue with the respondent. Thus, 
trading partners are more likely to join disputes featuring complainants that are involved in multilateral 
leadership within the WTO. Hence, we propose H6b: 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b). The greater the complainant’s involvement in multilateral leadership in 
the WTO, the more likely a trading partner is to join dispute consultations as a third party. 
Respondents. Respondents that serve in leadership positions and participate in negotiation groups 
in the WTO may also enjoy higher status, and be viewed more favorably by WTO members than 
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countries that are less involved in multilateral leadership, However, in such situations, there is a powerful 
disincentive for the respondent’s trading partners to support the complainants’ claims and join the dispute. 
Here, the respondent’s trading partners may experience a fear of possible retaliation by the respondent in 
future disputes or WTO activities (Blonigen & Bown, 2003). Thus, trading partners are less likely to join 
disputes when respondents are involved in multilateral leadership in the WTO. Hence, we propose H6c: 
Hypothesis 6c (H6c). The greater the respondent’s involvement in multilateral leadership in the 
WTO, the less likely a trading partner is to join dispute consultations as a third party. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Sources and Collection Procedures 
 Our primary data source is the official repository of public records maintained by the WTO on its 
online dispute settlement gateway website.14 This archive of WTO trade disputes, which we refer to as the 
HM dataset, was originally compiled by Horn and Mavroidis (2011) as part of a World Bank-sponsored 
study (Horn & Mavroidis, 2011).15  From the WTO website, we also download the complete records for 
all 426 disputes initiated from the inception of the WTO on January 1, 1995 until August 11, 2011.  
From the HM dataset and the WTO website, we extract data on the 308 out of 426 disputes (72% 
of the total) that are product-related and initiated during 1995-2011. We focus only on these product-
related disputes, since these situations involve tangible goods that may require geographically dispersed 
production or R&D activities that may impact MNEs’ risk management strategies. In contrast to trade in 
manufactured products, trade in services is typically a function of national policies on employee mobility 
and immigration, and is beyond the scope of this study. We augment the HM dataset with additional 
economic estimates from the Trade Flow and Trade Disputes (TFTD) database (Bown & Reynolds, 
2014). We also incorporate country-level time series data from the World Bank (WB), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), and the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (KOF). 
Variables 
                                                                                                              
14
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm 
15
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm 
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 We use the WTO, HM, TFTD, WB, IMF, UN, and KOF databases to construct and compute the 
following dependent, explanatory, and control variables, as described below. 
Dependent variables. To analyze trading partners’ likelihood of joining dispute consultations as 
third parties, we construct the binary variable Join using the WTO, HM, and TFTD databases. Join equals 
1 if the prospective trading partner joins dispute consultations and equals 0 if the partner does not join. 
Formal requests to Join must be submitted to the WTO within 10 days after the RFC is initiated. To 
ascertain the eventual outcome of the disputes in our sample, we use the HM and WTO databases to code 
the categorical variable Outcome. This variable equals 0 if the dispute remains in consultations, 1 if the 
dispute is resolved through a negotiated settlement by the complainant and respondent, and 2 if the 
dispute is resolved through a litigated settlement adjudicated by a WTO panel. (Note that all of our 
proposed hypotheses pertain only to the likelihood of trading partners joining dispute consultations (Join), 
and we use the Outcome variable to facilitate further post hoc exploratory analyses). 
Explanatory variables. We categorize our explanatory variables into two main groups: dispute-
level, and country-level. Our dispute-level variables are the strategic decision parameters that reflect the 
complainant’s framing of a dispute. Our country-level variables are observable dimensions of the 
multilateral leadership of complainants, partners, and respondents within the WTO, which are a matter of 
public record and known when the RFC is initiated.16 All of the disputes in our sample have only one 
complainant, one respondent, and two or more partners as possible third parties. The TFTD database 
compiles annual product-related bilateral trade flows reported by UN members to its Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). The TFTD further filters these trade flows to isolate the total value of the 
specific product(s) in each dispute. Since all of the trade disputes in our sample are product-related, the 
TFTD database enables us to construct the at-risk set of potential WTO member trading partners that may 
seek to Join a particular dispute. Hence, our at-risk set consists of all countries eligible to form a 
temporary coalition at the time that the complainant filed the RFC document to initiate the dispute. 
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 See https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/112/4/1251/1911732?redirectedFrom=fulltext 
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To capture the complainant’s framing of the legal basis of the dispute, we define the following 
variables using the WTO, HM, and TFTD databases. Alleged New Import Restriction is a binary variable, 
which equals 1 if the complainant claims that the respondent applied a new import restriction and equals 0 
if the complainant claims that the respondent failed to reform an existing import restriction. Alleged MFN 
Policy Change is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the complainant claims that the respondent 
selectively applied the policy change only to MFN trading partners and equals 0 if the complainant claims 
that the respondent globally applied the policy change to all of its trading partners. 
Dispute Importance is a continuous 0 to 100 index computed using the product-specific bilateral 
trade data in the TFTD database. Dispute Importance is each trading partner’s relative market share of the 
respondent’s imports aggregated across all of the products associated with the dispute. To avoid partial 
year effects, the market share is the average of the two full years immediately prior to the complainant’s 
claim of the date when the first alleged violation by the respondent occurred. Note that there is often a lag 
of years between the initial alleged violation by the respondent and the subsequent filing of the RFC by 
the complainant. By using the violation date instead of the RFC date, we are able to estimate the 
respondent’s dependence on importing the disputed products from the trading partner before any policy 
changes were allegedly applied. A higher value of Dispute Importance is associated with a dispute having 
a greater economic value for both the respondent and the trading partner.   
Dispute Risk is the percentage of words in the complainant’s formal RFC document that are 
associated with risk. We obtain this continuous measure (0 to 100 index) using the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) 2015 software, which analyzes the language used in written and spoken texts 
(Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). Dispute Risk 
represents the complainant’s framing of the potential level of risk generated by the respondent’s alleged 
violations. A higher Dispute Risk score conveys that the complainant views the dispute as having a higher 
perceived risk for the involved parties. We also use LIWC to compute the variable Dispute Urgency, 
which is the percentage of words in the complainant’s RFC that are associated with time. For this 
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continuous measure (0 to 100 index), a higher score reflects a greater perceived sense of urgency by the 
complainant in resolving the dispute.  
Next, we use the WTO’s historical records of its organizational structure to construct six 
additional variables associated with the multilateral leadership of trading partners, complainants, and 
respondents. Partner WTO Leadership is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 in a given year, if a 
representative from the trading partner country in an observation serves in an elected position in the WTO 
Secretariat or as a committee head in a council, committee, or working group of the WTO. Otherwise, the 
variable equals 0. Similarly, we construct the binary variables Complainant WTO Leadership and 
Respondent WTO Leadership. Within the WTO, there are 25 declared groups representing formal 
coalitions of countries actively involved in trade negotiations. Some groups such as the African Group or 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are aligned around regional issues, while others 
such G-33 (Agriculture) or TRIPS (Intellectual Property) are organized around specific products or 
topics.17 For each year in our sample time period, 1995-2011, we construct a network of WTO member 
countries and their membership in any WTO negotiation groups in existence during that year.18 Each 
country is a node in the network and we add a link between nodes corresponding to each negotiation 
group that the countries share in common. We compute the degree centrality for WTO member countries 
by year (Freeman, 1978). We use these values to generate the non-zero integer variables Partner Links to 
WTO Groups, Complainant Links to WTO Groups, and Respondent Links to WTO Groups. Note that our 
time-varying country-level leadership variables capture two distinct aspects of multilateral leadership in 
the WTO. The Partner WTO Leadership, Complainant WTO Leadership, and Respondent WTO 
Leadership variables estimate these countries’ involvement in the general global governance activities of 
the WTO. In contrast, the Partner Links to WTO Groups, Complainant Links to WTO Groups, and 
Respondent Links to WTO Groups estimate these countries’ participation in specific negotiating coalitions 
within the WTO. Both sets of measures estimate a country’s power and influence among WTO members. 
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 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm 
18
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/groups_e.pdf 
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Control Variables. For each observation in our sample, we code the following control variables. 
First, we compute three binary indicator variables: Partner EU Member, Complainant EU Member, and 
Respondent EU Member. These variables equal 1 if the respective country in a dispute is an EU member, 
and equal 0 otherwise. The EU as a whole and the individual EU countries are members of the WTO. The 
EU Trade Commissioner and the European Commission represent the interests of the EU in the decision-
making bodies of the WTO.19 In other words, EU member countries are part of a large European 
multilateral organization that is itself part of a larger global multilateral organization, namely the WTO. 
Thus, we explicitly account for EU membership among dispute participant countries.  
Next, we use the broad composite measure KOF Globalization (0 to 100 index) to approximate 
the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization in a particular country in a given year.20 
Partner Globalization, Complainant Globalization, and Respondent Globalization, respectively, are the 
values of the KOF Globalization Index of the countries in each observation record. A higher level of 
globalization is associated with greater participation and engagement in international trade activities and 
global governance systems. We also construct continuous control variables (0 to 100 index) for the 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index of a particular country in a given year.21 We call these variables 
Partner Fractionalization, Complainant Fractionalization, and Respondent Fractionalization. To control 
for the possible effects of geographic distance on the parties in a dispute, we obtain the latitude and 
longitude coordinates of each country’s national capital from the UN database. We use the coordinates to 
compute three great circle distances: Complainant-Respondent Distance, Complainant-Partner Distance, 
and Partner-Respondent Distance. We compute the base 10 logarithm of these distances in kilometers.  
Then, for each observation in our sample, we estimate the following dispute-level control 
variables. Product Breadth is the base 10 logarithm of the total number of 6-digit Harmonization Standard 
(HS) product codes specified in the complainant’s RFC. This measure represents the number of product 
categories associated with a dispute. Product Depth is the base 10 logarithm of the average number of 
                                                                                                              
19
 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-and-wto/ 
20
 See https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840500392078 
21
 See https://www.nber.org/papers/w9411 
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digits of all HS product codes specified in the complainant’s RFC. A larger number of HS digits reflects a 
narrower degree of specialization of the products in a dispute. Number of Agreements is the non-zero 
integer value of the total number of agreements cited in the complainant’s RFC. A larger Number of 
Agreements is associated with a more complex dispute. Number of Articles is the non-zero integer value 
of the total number of articles referenced within the agreements cited in the complainant’s RFC. A larger 
Number of Articles is associated with a greater number of legal claims made by the complainant. We 
control for the Word Count of the RFC using the count obtained by LIWC. A longer RFC is associated 
with a more detailed description of a dispute, which may affect the framing of the dispute. As a final step, 
we incorporate dummy variables for the year in which the dispute RFC is initiated. 
Model Specification 
We employ maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) methods and specify a binary logit model as 
shown in Equations 1 and 2 below. For a binary outcome variable, Yi, the variable pi(Xi) represents the 
probability that the ith observation of the vector of m predictors, Xi, equals 1.  𝒀𝒊 = {1,    𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2,𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑚,𝑖 + 𝜀 > 00.   otherwise        (1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖(𝑿𝑖)) = 𝑙𝑛 ( 𝑝𝑖(𝑿𝑖)1− 𝑝𝑖(𝑿𝑖)) = 𝛽 ∙ 𝑿𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2,𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑚,𝑖           (2) 
Our data consists of multiple observations for each of the 308 product-related disputes initiated 
during 1995-2011. An observation consists of one record for an individual trading partner country from 
the at-risk set of the respondent’s officially reported trading partners that were WTO members, and thus 
were eligible to join consultations when complainant filed the RFC. The structure of these observations is 
a potential partner-complainant-respondent triad. Our dependent variable, Yi, is Join. Our explanatory 
variables are a vector, Xi, of the previously defined measures related to: (1) Alleged New Import 
Restriction, Alleged MFN Policy Change, Dispute Importance, Dispute Risk, and Dispute Urgency for the 
complainant’s framing of the dispute; and (2) WTO Leadership and Links to WTO Groups for the partner, 
complainant, and respondent country. The vector Xi also includes our control variables for the measures 
related to: (1) EU Membership, Globalization, and Fractionalization for the partner, complainant, and 
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respondent country; (2) the geographic Distance between the three possible country dyads among the 
partner, complainant, and respondent, and (3) the Product Depth, Product Breadth, Number of 
Agreements, Number of Articles, and Word Count associated with the dispute RFC document.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Our sample consists of a total of 23,190 observations for 308 product-related trade disputes 
during 1995-2011. The mean number of possible trading partners across all disputes is 74.4 countries, in 
the range from 2 to 145 countries. Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics and correlations. In terms of 
Outcome, about 19% of disputes remain in consultations, 15% of disputes are resolved via negotiated 
settlement outside the WTO, and 66% of disputes are resolved via litigated settlement within the WTO 
panel adjudication process. The mean value for Join is 0.14, indicating that about 14% of the prospective 
trading partners join dispute consultations.  
In terms of framing the dispute, in 76% of disputes, complainants claim that the respondent 
applied an Alleged New Import Restriction. In 50% of disputes, complainants claim that the respondent 
applied an Alleged MFN Policy Change. The mean values for Dispute Importance, Dispute Risk, and 
Dispute Urgency are 0.94, 0.31, and 2.93, respectively. In terms of multilateral leadership, the mean 
values of Partner WTO Leadership, Complainant WTO Leadership, and Respondent WTO Leadership 
respectively indicate that 6% of trading partners, 52% of complainants, and 67% of respondents have a 
representative serving in an official leadership capacity within the WTO when a dispute is initiated. The 
mean values for Partner Links to WTO Groups, Complainant Links to WTO Groups, and Respondent 
Links to WTO Groups are 4.50, 4.51, and 4.41, respectively, which indicates the average strength of 
partner, complainant, and respondent participation in WTO negotiation groups.  
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
As shown in Table 1 above, the largest significant correlation appears to be -0.70, which is 
between the variables Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) and Respondent Links to WTO Groups. 
This is expected, since respondents with greater engagement in international trade and global governance 
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are more likely to participate in WTO negotiation groups. We check multi-collinearity diagnostics across 
all models and find that the average variance inflation factor (VIF) for our variables is 1.77 and no 
variable exceeds 2.99, indicating that multi-collinearity is not a concern in any of our models. 
Analyses for Join Consultations 
 We report the results from the logit models of our analyses of conflict framing and multilateral 
leadership in Table 2 and 3 below. Table 2 reports the coefficients. For ease of interpretation, Table 3 
reports the odds ratios and average marginal effects. Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3 is the controls-only 
model. As we move from left to right in both tables, we add explanatory variables to Models 2-4 for 
testing our hypotheses H1 through H6. Model 5 in Table 3 estimates the average marginal effects. Across 
all of our models in Tables 2 and 3, we observe that the coefficients for a number of control variables are 
significant, and all appear to be consistent in the expected direction. 
< INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
As shown in the conflict framing plus controls model in Tables 2 and 3 above, an Alleged New 
Import Restriction is associated with 88% higher odds (Model 2: β=0.631, p=0.000) of a trading partner 
joining a dispute consultation. In the full model in both tables above, an Alleged New Import Restriction 
is associated with 98% higher odds (Model 4: β=0.681, p=0.000) of a partner joining a consultation. 
Taken together, these results fully support H1. An Alleged MFN Policy Change is associated with 55% 
(Model 2: β=-0.802, p=0.000) to 61% lower odds (Model 4: β=-0.935, p=0.000) of a trading partner 
joining a consultation, which fully supports H2.  
A 1-unit increase in the Dispute Importance index is associated with about 6% (Model 4: β=-
0.058, p=0.000) to 7% (Model 2: β=-0.067, p=0.000) higher odds of a trading partner joining a 
consultation, which fully supports H3. A 1-unit increase in the Dispute Risk index is associated with 
about 45% (Model 2: β=0.372, p=0.000) to 48% (Model 4: β=0.389, p=0.000) higher odds of a trading 
partner joining a consultation, which fully supports H4. For a 1-unit increase in the Dispute Urgency 
index, the coefficients are positive, which is the expected direction, but are not significant (Model 2: 
β=0.040, p=0.184 and Model 4: β=0.040, p=0.179). Thus, we do not find support for H5. 
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As shown in the multilateral leadership plus controls model in Tables 2 and 3 above, Partner 
WTO Leadership is associated with 436% higher odds (Model 3: β=1.678, p=0.000) of a trading partner 
joining a dispute consultation. In the full model in both tables above, Partner WTO Leadership is 
associated with 374% higher odds (Model 4: β=1.555, p=0.000) of a partner joining a consultation. A 1-
unit increase in the number of Partner Links to WTO Groups is associated with 33% (Model 4: β=0.282, 
p=0.000) to 34% (Model 3: β=0.294, p=0.000) higher odds of a partner joining. The results for Partner 
WTO Leadership and Partner Links to WTO Groups presented in Models 3 and 4 fully support H6a.  
Complainant WTO Leadership is associated with 52% (Model 3: β=0.417, p=0.000) to 58% 
higher odds (Model 4: β=0.459, p=0.000) of a trading partner joining a consultation. However, a 1-unit 
increase in the number of Complainant Links to WTO Groups is not significant in Model 3 or 4 (Model 3: 
β=0.000, p=0.996 and Model 4: β=-0.049, p=0.170). These results partially support H6b.  
Respondent WTO Leadership is associated with 14% (Model 3: β=0.132, p=0.056) to 59% higher 
odds (Model 4: β=0.462, p=0.000) of a trading partner joining a consultation. These results are significant 
but are in the opposite direction as H6c. A 1-unit increase in the number of Respondent Links to WTO 
Groups is negative and significant in Model 3 (β=-0.098, p=0.006), but not in Model 4 (β=-0.040, 
p=0.286). Thus, we do not find support for H6c.  
Overall, we claim empirical support for four out of our five conflict framing hypotheses on the 
expected effects of Alleged New Import Restriction (H1), Alleged MFN Policy Change (H2), Dispute 
Importance (H3), and Dispute Risk (H4) on the likelihood of a trading partner joining dispute 
consultations. We do not find support for our hypothesis on the expected effect of Dispute Urgency (H5). 
We also claim empirical support for one out of our three multilateral leadership hypotheses. For trading 
partners, we find support for the positive effects of Partner WTO Leadership and Partner Links to WTO 
Groups (H6a). For complainants, we claim partial support only for the positive effect of Complainant 
WTO Leadership (H6b). We do not find support for the expected positive effect of Complainant Links to 
WTO Groups. For respondents, we do not find support for our hypothesis for the negative effects of 
Respondent WTO Leadership and Respondent Links to WTO Groups (H6c). Counter to our expectations, 
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we find that Respondent WTO Leadership is positive and significant. In line with our expectations, we 
find that Respondent Links to WTO Groups is negative. However, this is not significant in the full model. 
In sum, a total of five out of our eight hypotheses are fully supported, one is partially supported, and two 
are not supported by our empirical results. 
Economic Significance 
 For easier interpretation of our results, we analyze the average marginal effects, report the 
predicted probability values as Model 5 in Table 3, and plot these values in Figure 1 below. 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
As shown in Model 5 in Table 3 and plotted in Figure 1, across all trading partners in our sample, 
an Alleged New Import Restriction is associated with about a 4% higher predicted probability of the 
partner country joining a dispute consultation. An Alleged MFN Policy Change is associated with about a 
6% lower predicted probability of the partner joining a consultation. Recall that a 1-unit increase in the 
Dispute Importance index corresponds to a 1-percentage point increase in the trading partner’s relative 
market share of the respondent’s imports aggregated for the products associated with the dispute. We find 
that a 1-unit increase in Dispute Importance is associated with a 0.3% higher predicted probability of the 
partner joining a consultation. Also, recall that a 1-unit increase in the Dispute Risk index corresponds to 
1-percentage point increase the number of risk-related words used by the complainant in composing the 
RFC. We find that a 1-unit increase in Dispute Risk is associated with a 2% higher predicted probability 
of the partner joining a consultation. The effect of Dispute Risk appears to be an order of magnitude 
greater than the effect of Dispute Importance, but comparable in magnitude to the effects of an Alleged 
New Import Restriction and an Alleged MFN Policy Change.  
Partner WTO Leadership is associated with about an 11% higher predicted probability of the 
partner country joining a dispute consultation. A 1-unit increase in the number of Partner Links to WTO 
Groups is associated with a 2% higher predicted probability of the partner joining a consultation. 
Complainant WTO Leadership and Respondent WTO Leadership are both associated with about a 3% 
higher predicted probability of a trading partner joining a consultation. Among the explanatory variables 
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hypothesized to have an effect on the likelihood of trading partners joining dispute consultations, Partner 
WTO Leadership appears to have the largest overall impact. 
Post hoc Exploratory Analyses  
Our empirical results and interpretation of their economic significance prompted us to explore the 
potential effects of conflict framing and multilateral leadership on the eventual outcomes of disputes. We 
envision that these additional analyses may be helpful for scholars, MNE managers, and policymakers to 
use in anticipating trade dispute outcomes. First, we returned to our original sample of 23,190 
observations for 308 product-related trade disputes. We generated individual observations for every 
realized partner-complainant-respondent triad and every complainant-respondent dyad in which no 
partner joined the consultation. This restricted our sample to 3,207 observations.22 We constructed a new 
variable called the Number of Third Parties, which is the integer count of the total number of trading 
partners that joined the consultations for a given dispute. The mean number of trading partners joining 
disputes is 6.2 partner countries, ranging from 0 to 18 countries. We replace our previous binary 
dependent variable Join with the categorical dependent variable Outcome. We retain all of our previous 
explanatory variables. We also incorporate the Number of Third Parties as an additional dispute-level 
control variable. We then conduct our analyses using an MLE multinomial logit model. We report the 
results of these models in Table 4 below. 
< INSERT TABLE 4 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
Table 4 lists the coefficients, relative risk ratios, and average marginal effects for the full models. 
The outcomes are 0=In Consultations, 1=Negotiated Settlement, and 2=Litigated Settlement. Model 3 in 
Table 4 lists the average marginal effects for two comparisons of the outcomes 0 vs. 1 (In Consultations 
vs. Negotiated Settlement) and 2 vs. 1 (Litigated Settlement vs. Negotiated Settlement). For ease of 
interpretation, we plot these predicted probability values from Model 3 in Figure 2 above. In terms of the 
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 The number of observations is 3,207 because we account for situations in which multiple countries within the EU either initiate 
an RFC through the European Commission or join consultations as trading partners. Since 19% of complainants and 20% of 
trading partners are EU members, this increases the number of observations required to fully represent each complainant-
respondent dyad and each partner-complainant-respondent triad.  
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predicted probability of remaining in consultations versus reaching a negotiated settlement, the economic 
significance of conflict framing is as follows: Alleged New Import Restriction (+11%, p=0.000), Alleged 
MFN Policy Change (+6%, p=0.000), Dispute Risk (+3%, p=0.085), and Dispute Urgency (+1%, 
p=0.051). The economic significance of multilateral leadership is as follows: Partner Links to WTO 
Groups (4%, p=0.003), Complainant WTO Leadership (-4%, p=0.025), Respondent WTO Leadership (-
9%, p=0.000), and Respondent Links to WTO Groups (-4%, p=0.000). 
In terms of the predicted probability of reaching a litigated versus a negotiated settlement, the 
economic significance of conflict framing is as follows: Alleged New Import Restriction (-6%, p=0.002), 
Alleged MFN Policy Change (+6%, p=0.001), and Dispute Urgency (+3%, p=0.002). The economic 
significance of multilateral leadership is as follows: Partner WTO Leadership (+6%, p=0.081), Partner 
Links to WTO Groups (-3%, p=0.088), Complainant WTO Leadership (9%, p=0.000), Complainant Links 
to WTO Groups (3%, p=0.001). Respondent WTO Leadership (12%, p=0.000), and Respondent Links to 
WTO Groups (6%, p=0.000). Overall, our post hoc exploratory analyses of the eventual outcomes of 
disputes indicate that conflict framing and multilateral leadership have economically significant effects on 
the predicted probability of remaining in consultations, reaching a negotiated settlement, or reaching a 
litigated settlement. We note that although a 1-unit increase in Dispute Urgency does not appear to have a 
significant effect on the likelihood that a partner joins a consultation, it does appear to have significant 
effects on dispute outcomes. The effects of WTO Leadership and Links to WTO Groups appear to vary 
considerably across partners, complainants, and respondents. Our results suggest that conflict framing and 
multilateral leadership may have meaningful effects not only on who joins product-related trade disputes, 
but also on how these disputes are resolved.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As stated at the outset of our study, we explore WTO members’ propensity to participate as third 
parties in disputes and thereby form temporary coalitions with other nations. We identify conflict framing 
and multilateral leadership as two sets of meaningful predictors of the likelihood of a trading partner 
joining dispute consultations. MNE managers may seek to use these predictors to guide their decision-
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making regarding strategic risk management activities. Such activities may mitigate MNEs’ uncertainty 
about the specific countries that are likely involved in and affected by trade disputes. Knowledge about 
countries’ participation in disputes may help MNE managers evaluate and prioritize critical decisions 
about potentially shifting and possibly reconfiguring the locations where production and R&D take place. 
Regarding the framing of the underlying conflict that is the legal basis of the dispute, the WTO 
DSB’s processes give the complainant the opportunity to shape WTO members’ perceptions of the 
respondent’s alleged violations of trade policies. We find that Alleged New Import Restriction is 
associated with about a 4% higher predicted probability of the partner country joining a dispute 
consultation, while an Alleged MFN Policy Change is associated with about a 6% lower predicted 
probability of the partner joining consultations. We find positive and significant, but smaller effects for 
unit increases in our measures of Dispute Importance (+0.3%) and Dispute Risk (+2%) on the predicted 
probability of the partner joining consultations. Partner WTO Leadership appears to have the largest 
overall impact (+11%) on the predicted probability of the partner country joining a dispute consultation, 
while a unit increase in the number of Partner Links to WTO Groups (+2%) also has a positive and 
significant effect. On the whole, our findings suggest that there are observable dimensions of disputes and 
disputants that are significant predictors of WTO members’ propensity to join dispute consultations.  
Contributions and Implications 
Our research contributes to the literature on international trade dispute resolution, global 
governance, and multilateral organizations in terms of theory, methods, and empirical findings. Our study 
has implications for the strategic risk management decisions of MNE managers. We directly address a 
critical gap in the literature by accounting for coalition formation as a key element of the dispute 
resolution process. We go beyond prior research, which almost exclusively examines bilateral 
complainant-respondent dyads, and investigate multilateral trading partner-complainant-respondent triads. 
Our research design introduces and utilizes several new measures for estimating and quantifying conflict 
framing and multilateral leadership within the WTO. We conduct a large-scale empirical test to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology. Our analyses may be among the first to include the 
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entire at-risk set of potential and actual triads of participants in product-related trade disputes. Our 
findings reveal the economic significance of the effects of conflict framing and multilateral leadership on 
the likelihood that a trading partner joins a dispute. Our post hoc exploratory analyses indicate that 
framing and leadership also have economically significant effects on eventual dispute outcomes and the 
likelihood of remaining in consultations or negotiating or litigating a settlement. 
For scholars, our research implies that delving more deeply into the process of coalition 
formation in multilateral organizations such as the WTO may yield useful insights on the strategic 
consequences of members’ engagement in core activities such as dispute resolution. Our research also 
suggests that analyzing the construction and composition of legal narratives in dispute documents such as 
RFCs may be a viable approach for uncovering how complainants shape WTO members’ perceptions of 
the impact and relevance of disputes.  
For managers of MNEs involved in exporting and importing, our research implies that focusing 
on the complainant’s description of the type of alleged violations committed by the respondent is helpful 
in understanding the potential participation of various countries in the dispute. To the extent that 
managers are seeking to export to and/or import from the respondent country and its known trading 
partners, predicting the participation of these countries in trade disputes may help guide strategic planning 
efforts and help mitigate operational risks.  
For policymakers evaluating, designing, and implementing new trade policies, our measures and 
methodology facilitate the development of tools for evidence-based counterfactual policy analyses. Our 
findings suggest that there may be considerable value in systematically analyzing the content of the WTO 
archives to generate predictive analytics about the perceptions, participants, and outcomes of disputes. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Like all studies, our study has limitations that provide opportunities for future research. Although 
the WTO DSB often serves as a benchmark for best practices in global governance and indirectly 
influences the administration of other major institutions such as the UN and the EU, the generalizability 
of our findings to dispute resolution processes within other multilateral organizations is limited.  Our 
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study also focuses on only one type of trade dispute (product-related) during 1995-2011. After 2012, a 
shift occurred in which WTO disputes about non-tariff measures (NTMs) and trade in services markedly 
increased. “The range of NTMs is vast, complex, driven by multiple policy motives, and ever-changing ... 
Transparency is a major issue with regard to both NTMs and services measures. Despite recent efforts 
aimed at filling the information gap in this area, data remain sparse.”23 We encourage follow-on 
comparative studies on dispute resolution processes across different multilateral organizations and 
different types of disputes. For example, investigating the mechanisms within the EU for trade in services 
dispute resolution in comparison to the WTO may be an interesting new area for further exploration. 
In addition, we conduct our research at the country level and our unit of analysis is the country-
product. Hence, we do not evaluate the composition and characteristics of the teams negotiating and 
litigating on behalf of the complainants, respondents, and prospective third parties in each dispute. We are 
unable to make inferences about the effectiveness of various team-based negotiation and litigation 
strategies for resolving trade disputes. We believe that future research should pursue improvements in 
these areas. Understanding how the participation of third parties at the country level in international trade 
disputes affects the worldwide risk management strategies of MNEs at the firm level, might be an 
especially promising avenue for further scholarly inquiry. We believe that in an era of greater uncertainty 
and unpredictability about the economic and geopolitical interactions among nations, investigating 
conflict framing and multilateral leadership in a variety of forms will be a worthwhile research endeavor. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
Dependent Variables                  
1. Outcome 1.18 0.87 0.00 2.00 1.00             
2. Join 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.15 1.00            
Explanatory Variables                  
Conflict Framing                  
3. Alleged New Import Restriction 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.07 1.00           
4. Alleged MFN Policy Change 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.12 0.01 0.31 1.00          
5. Dispute Importance (0-100 index) 0.94 4.66 0.00 100.00 -0.01 0.14 0.00 0.01 1.00         
6. Dispute Risk (0-100 index) 0.31 0.42 0.00 3.89 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.35 0.00 1.00        
7. Dispute Urgency (0-100 index) 2.93 1.13 0.37 7.33 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.01 -0.27 1.00       
Multilateral Leadership                  
8. Partner WTO Leadership 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.01 1.00      
9. Complainant WTO Leadership 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 1.00     
10. Respondent WTO Leadership 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 1.00    
11. Partner Links to WTO Groups 4.50 1.66 1.00 9.00 0.00 -0.23 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03 1.00   
12. Complainant Links to WTO Groups 4.51 1.30 1.00 8.00 0.05 -0.05 0.19 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.52 0.12 -0.01 1.00  
13. Respondent Links to WTO Groups 4.41 1.30 1.00 8.00 -0.06 0.08 -0.16 -0.13 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.04 0.10 -0.54 -0.01 -0.11 1.00 
Control Variables                  
14. Partner EU Member 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.55 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 -0.44 -0.01 0.03 
15. Complainant EU Member 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0.11 -0.11 -0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.49 -0.10 0.00 -0.59 0.18 
16. Respondent EU Member 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 0.37 0.01 0.16 -0.57 
17. Partner Globalization (0-100 index) 60.84 17.68 21.24 92.63 -0.03 0.41 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.53 0.02 0.06 
18. Complainant Globalization (0-100 index) 70.02 13.28 35.67 91.09 0.01 0.04 -0.16 -0.23 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.45 -0.03 0.01 -0.69 0.07 
19. Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) 70.25 12.77 41.91 91.94 0.12 -0.04 0.21 0.23 -0.02 0.08 0.12 -0.03 -0.14 0.43 0.00 0.22 -0.70 
20. Partner Fractionalization (0-100 index) 33.72 25.30 0.02 89.55 0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.00 -0.02 
21. Complainant Fractionalization (0-100 index) 29.80 21.13 0.30 81.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.07 
22. Respondent Fractionalization (0-100 index) 31.34 20.28 0.30 81.03 0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.00 -0.16 0.17 
23. Complainant-Respondent Distance in km (log) 3.77 0.37 2.21 4.28 0.07 0.01 -0.19 -0.10 0.01 -0.17 0.10 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.17 0.11 
24. Complainant-Partner Distance in km (log) 3.82 0.35 2.21 4.30 0.06 -0.25 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.14 0.12 0.20 0.29 -0.06 
25. Partner-Respondent Distance in km (log) 3.80 0.34 1.75 4.30 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.21 -0.03 0.25 
26. Product Breadth (log) 0.92 0.69 0.30 3.35 0.10 0.02 -0.16 -0.19 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.09 0.06 
27. Product Depth (log) 0.77 0.17 0.48 1.04 0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.13 -0.03 0.21 -0.12 
28. Number of Agreements 2.35 1.06 1.00 6.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.18 -0.02 -0.02 -0.34 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
29. Number of Articles 10.15 7.94 1.00 40.00 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.35 -0.01 0.39 -0.24 -0.01 -0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.06 
30. Word Count of RFC (log) 2.85 0.31 2.25 4.04 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.18 -0.01 0.31 -0.20 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
  Variable 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 
Control Variables (Continued) 
                 
14. Partner EU Member 1.00                 
15. Complainant EU Member -0.01 1.00                
16. Respondent EU Member -0.03 -0.26 1.00               
17. Partner Globalization (0-100 index) 0.63 -0.02 -0.06 1.00              
18. Complainant Globalization (0-100 index) -0.01 0.49 -0.11 -0.02 1.00             
19. Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) -0.02 -0.17 0.52 -0.02 -0.16 1.00            
20. Partner Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.24 0.01 0.02 1.00           
21. Complainant Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.00 -0.13 0.08 -0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 1.00          
22. Respondent Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.02 0.16 -0.19 -0.05 0.15 -0.30 0.03 -0.05 1.00         
23. Complainant-Respondent Distance in km (log) -0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.07 -0.14 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.12 1.00        
24. Complainant-Partner Distance in km (log) -0.21 -0.30 0.09 -0.19 -0.21 0.08 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 1.00       
25. Partner-Respondent Distance in km (log) -0.20 0.11 -0.29 -0.17 0.06 -0.17 0.13 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.12 1.00      
26. Product Breadth (log) -0.04 0.16 -0.22 -0.08 0.20 -0.31 0.02 -0.06 0.37 0.13 0.00 0.10 1.00     
27. Product Depth (log) 0.07 -0.03 0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.36 1.00    
28. Number of Agreements -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.30 0.07 1.00   
29. Number of Articles 0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.17 0.12 0.01 0.17 -0.05 -0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.17 0.38 1.00  
30. Word Count of RFC (log) 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.41 1.00 
N = 23,190; p<0.05 in bold                  
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Table 2. Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Hypothesis Tested (Controls Only) H1-H5 H6a-H6c H1-H6 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Dependent Variable Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations 
Explanatory Variables     
Conflict Framing     
Alleged New Import Restriction  0.631  0.681 
  (0.087)  (0.089) 
  0.000  0.000 
Alleged MFN Policy Change  -0.802  -0.935 
  (0.071)  (0.076) 
  0.000  0.000 
Dispute Importance (0-100 index)  0.067  0.058 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
  0.000  0.000 
Dispute Risk (0-100 index)  0.372  0.389 
  (0.080)  (0.080) 
  0.000  0.000 
Dispute Urgency (0-100 index)  0.040  0.040 
  (0.030)  (0.029) 
  0.184  0.179 
Multilateral Leadership     
Partner WTO Leadership   1.678 1.555 
   (0.106) (0.110) 
   0.000 0.000 
Complainant WTO Leadership   0.417 0.459 
   (0.081) (0.084) 
   0.000 0.000 
Respondent WTO Leadership   0.132 0.462 
   (0.069) (0.075) 
   0.056 0.000 
Partner Links to WTO Groups   0.294 0.282 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
   0.000 0.000 
Complainant Links to WTO Groups   0.000 -0.049 
   (0.035) (0.036) 
   0.996 0.170 
Respondent Links to WTO Groups   -0.098 -0.040 
   (0.036) (0.037) 
   0.006 0.286 
Control Variables     
Partner EU Member 2.691 2.861 3.441 3.568 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.093) (0.096) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant EU Member 0.476 0.463 0.332 0.304 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.098) (0.101) 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Respondent EU Member -1.382 -1.437 -1.659 -1.766 
 (0.148) (0.144) (0.146) (0.145) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partner Globalization (0-100 index) 0.036 0.034 0.040 0.038 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant Globalization (0-100 index) -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.015 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 0.332 0.098 0.008 0.000 
Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) 0.015 0.022 0.010 0.015 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Hypothesis Tested (Controls Only) H1-H5 H6a-H6c H1-H6 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Dependent Variable Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations 
Control Variables (Continued)     
Partner Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.041 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Respondent Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant-Respondent Distance in km (log) 0.763 0.828 0.803 0.847 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.090) (0.093) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant-Partner Distance in km (log) -1.213 -1.278 -1.450 -1.500 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) (0.084) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partner-Respondent Distance in km (log) 1.482 1.814 1.440 1.721 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.137) (0.139) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Product Breadth (log) -0.108 -0.182 -0.090 -0.204 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.051) (0.055) 
 0.027 0.001 0.074 0.000 
Product Depth (log) -0.072 0.280 -0.111 0.436 
 (0.193) (0.208) (0.201) (0.219) 
 0.711 0.177 0.582 0.047 
Number of Agreements 0.076 0.036 0.078 0.031 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) 
 0.012 0.284 0.011 0.368 
Number of Articles 0.007 0.016 0.008 0.019 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 0.143 0.002 0.095 0.000 
Word Count of RFC (log) 0.451 0.658 0.420 0.512 
 (0.114) (0.125) (0.119) (0.128) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Constant -9.654 -12.456 -9.453 -11.487 
 (0.847) (0.930) (0.875) (0.946) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Observations 23,190 23,190 23,190 23,190 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared 0.448 0.470 0.474 0.493 
Degree of freedom 33 38 39 44 
Chi square 4206 4091 4326 4219 
Log Likelihood -5144 -4941 -4897 -4718 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standardized Coefficients and p-values are reported; Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 3. Summary of Binary Logistic Regression Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesis Tested (Controls Only) H1-H5 H6a-H6c H1-H6 H1-H6 
 Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Average Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations 
Explanatory Variables      
Conflict Framing      
Alleged New Import Restriction  1.880  1.975 0.038 
  (0.164)  (0.176) (0.005) 
  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Alleged MFN Policy Change  0.448  0.392 -0.056 
  (0.032)  (0.030) (0.005) 
  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Dispute Importance (0-100 index)  1.070  1.060 0.003 
  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.000) 
  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Dispute Risk (0-100 index)  1.451  1.476 0.023 
  (0.116)  (0.117) (0.005) 
  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Dispute Urgency (0-100 index)  1.040  1.040 0.002 
  (0.031)  (0.031) (0.002) 
  0.184  0.179 0.178 
Multilateral Leadership      
Partner WTO Leadership   5.355 4.737 0.113 
   (0.565) (0.521) (0.009) 
   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant WTO Leadership   1.517 1.583 0.027 
   (0.123) (0.133) (0.005) 
   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Respondent WTO Leadership   1.141 1.588 0.027 
   (0.079) (0.118) (0.004) 
   0.056 0.000 0.000 
Partner Links to WTO Groups   1.342 1.325 0.017 
   (0.027) (0.028) (0.001) 
   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant Links to WTO Groups   1.000 0.952 -0.003 
   (0.035) (0.034) (0.002) 
   0.996 0.170 0.170 
Respondent Links to WTO Groups   0.907 0.961 -0.002 
   (0.032) (0.036) (0.002) 
   0.006 0.286 0.285 
Control Variables      
Partner EU Member 14.751 17.472 31.213 35.461 0.372 
 (1.190) (1.457) (2.909) (3.404) (0.012) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant EU Member 1.610 1.589 1.394 1.356 0.019 
 (0.139) (0.143) (0.136) (0.137) (0.006) 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 
Respondent EU Member 0.251 0.238 0.190 0.171 -0.093 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.006) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partner Globalization (0-100 index) 1.037 1.035 1.041 1.039 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant Globalization (0-100 index) 0.997 0.995 0.991 0.985 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) 
 0.332 0.098 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) 1.016 1.022 1.010 1.015 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesis Tested (Controls Only) H1-H5 H6a-H6c H1-H6 H1-H6 
 Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Average Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations Join Consultations 
Control Variables (Continued)      
Partner Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.997 0.995 0.996 0.995 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 0.041 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Respondent Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.992 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant-Respondent Distance in km (log) 2.144 2.288 2.231 2.332 0.050 
 (0.173) (0.190) (0.201) (0.216) (0.005) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complainant-Partner Distance in km (log) 0.297 0.279 0.234 0.223 -0.089 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.005) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partner-Respondent Distance in km (log) 4.400 6.138 4.222 5.590 0.103 
 (0.595) (0.829) (0.579) (0.776) (0.008) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Product Breadth (log) 0.897 0.834 0.914 0.815 -0.012 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.003) 
 0.027 0.001 0.074 0.000 0.000 
Product Depth (log) 0.931 1.324 0.895 1.546 0.026 
 (0.180) (0.275) (0.180) (0.339) (0.013) 
 0.711 0.177 0.582 0.047 0.047 
Number of Agreements 1.079 1.036 1.081 1.031 0.002 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.002) 
 0.012 0.284 0.011 0.368 0.368 
Number of Articles 1.007 1.016 1.008 1.020 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
 0.143 0.002 0.095 0.000 0.000 
Word Count of RFC (log) 1.569 1.930 1.522 1.669 0.031 
 (0.179) (0.240) (0.182) (0.214) (0.008) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
      
Observations 23,190 23,190 23,190 23,190 23,190 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared 0.448 0.470 0.474 0.493  
Degree of freedom 33 38 39 44  
Chi square 4206 4091 4326 4219  
Log Likelihood -5144 -4941 -4897 -4718   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Coefficients reported as Odds Ratios and Average Marginal Effects; p-values are reported; Robust Standard errors and Delta-method 
standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4. Summary of Multinomial Logistic Regression Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Tested H1-H6 H1-H6 H1-H6 
 Coefficients Relative-Risk Ratios Average Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  
Explanatory Variables       
Conflict Framing       
Alleged New Import Restriction 1.587 0.172 4.891 1.188 0.113 -0.062 
 (0.225) (0.187) (1.101) (0.222) (0.011) (0.020) 
 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.002 
Alleged MFN Policy Change 1.478 1.133 4.383 3.105 0.058 0.062 
 (0.218) (0.196) (0.953) (0.609) (0.013) (0.019) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Dispute Importance (0-100 index) 0.014 0.006 1.014 1.006 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.199 0.582 0.199 0.582 0.128 0.967 
Dispute Risk (0-100 index) 0.563 0.344 1.755 1.410 0.029 0.011 
 (0.307) (0.264) (0.540) (0.372) (0.017) (0.023) 
 0.067 0.192 0.067 0.192 0.085 0.632 
Dispute Urgency (0-100 index) 0.411 0.370 1.509 1.447 0.013 0.025 
 (0.093) (0.074) (0.140) (0.107) (0.007) (0.008) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.002 
Multilateral Leadership       
Partner WTO Leadership 0.368 0.619 1.444 1.857 -0.010 0.059 
 (0.407) (0.334) (0.588) (0.620) (0.028) (0.034) 
 0.366 0.064 0.366 0.064 0.733 0.081 
Complainant WTO Leadership -0.053 0.581 0.948 1.787 -0.043 0.085 
 (0.239) (0.167) (0.226) (0.299) (0.019) (0.021) 
 0.823 0.001 0.823 0.001 0.025 0.000 
Respondent WTO Leadership -0.571 0.568 0.565 1.765 -0.093 0.121 
 (0.206) (0.160) (0.116) (0.282) (0.016) (0.018) 
 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partner Links to WTO Groups 0.410 0.001 1.506 1.001 0.038 -0.027 
 (0.179) (0.145) (0.269) (0.145) (0.013) (0.016) 
 0.022 0.995 0.022 0.995 0.003 0.088 
Complainant Links to WTO Groups 0.234 0.340 1.263 1.405 -0.001 0.033 
 (0.104) (0.074) (0.132) (0.104) (0.009) (0.010) 
 0.025 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.872 0.001 
Respondent Links to WTO Groups -0.155 0.348 0.856 1.416 -0.038 0.060 
 (0.084) (0.066) (0.072) (0.094) (0.006) (0.008) 
 0.066 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables       
Partner EU Member 0.436 0.007 1.547 1.007 0.038 -0.027 
 (0.446) (0.363) (0.690) (0.366) (0.031) (0.041) 
 0.328 0.984 0.328 0.984 0.208 0.506 
Complainant EU Member 0.907 -0.084 2.476 0.919 0.100 -0.081 
 (0.318) (0.252) (0.788) (0.232) (0.030) (0.032) 
 0.004 0.739 0.004 0.739 0.001 0.011 
Respondent EU Member -0.372 -1.456 0.689 0.233 0.058 -0.201 
 (0.480) (0.331) (0.330) (0.077) (0.050) (0.049) 
 0.437 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.250 0.000 
Number of Third Parties -0.185 0.301 0.831 1.351 -0.037 0.055 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.039) (0.002) (0.002) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4. (Continued)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Tested H1-H6 H1-H6 H1-H6 
 Coefficients Relative-Risk Ratios Average Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  In Consultations  Litigated Settlement  
Control Variables (Continued)       
Partner Globalization (0-100 index) 0.019 -0.001 1.019 0.999 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.094 0.892 0.094 0.892 0.028 0.148 
Complainant Globalization (0-100 index) 0.065 0.061 1.067 1.062 0.002 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Respondent Globalization (0-100 index) -0.037 0.001 0.964 1.001 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.002 0.944 0.002 0.944 0.000 0.014 
Partner Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.004 0.004 1.004 1.004 0.000 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.420 0.281 0.420 0.281 0.811 0.453 
Complainant Fractionalization (0-100 index) 0.020 0.015 1.020 1.015 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.045 
Respondent Fractionalization (0-100 index) -0.001 -0.001 0.999 0.999 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.764 0.729 0.764 0.729 0.902 0.818 
Complainant-Respondent Distance in km (log) -0.435 -0.164 0.647 0.849 -0.029 0.006 
 (0.239) (0.191) (0.154) (0.162) (0.017) (0.021) 
 0.068 0.391 0.068 0.391 0.085 0.776 
Complainant-Partner Distance in km (log) -0.307 -0.072 0.736 0.931 -0.023 0.010 
 (0.242) (0.218) (0.178) (0.203) (0.016) (0.022) 
 0.205 0.742 0.205 0.742 0.132 0.643 
Partner-Respondent Distance in km (log) -0.690 -0.412 0.502 0.662 -0.036 -0.012 
 (0.434) (0.368) (0.218) (0.244) (0.028) (0.037) 
 0.112 0.263 0.112 0.263 0.198 0.742 
Product Breadth (log) 0.397 0.490 1.488 1.632 0.004 0.043 
 (0.174) (0.147) (0.260) (0.240) (0.010) (0.014) 
 0.023 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.724 0.002 
Product Depth (log) -1.015 -2.768 0.363 0.063 0.093 -0.325 
 (0.652) (0.445) (0.236) (0.028) (0.050) (0.055) 
 0.120 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.065 0.000 
Number of Agreements 0.063 -0.750 1.066 0.472 0.056 -0.111 
 (0.119) (0.085) (0.127) (0.040) (0.008) (0.009) 
 0.593 0.000 0.593 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Articles -0.045 0.076 0.956 1.079 -0.009 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Word Count of RFC (log) 1.179 -0.936 3.250 0.392 0.171 -0.212 
 (0.389) (0.323) (1.264) (0.127) (0.024) (0.031) 
 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 
       
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
Constant -6.027 -2.382 0.002 0.092   
 
(2.352) (1.942) (0.006) (0.179)   
 
0.010 0.220 0.010 0.220   
       
Observations 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 3,207 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318   
Degree of freedom 58 58 58 58   
Chi square 1617 1617 1617 1617   
Log Likelihood -1872 -1872 -1872 -1872     
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The base outcome is Negotiated Settlement; Standardized Coefficients, Relative-Risk Ratios, Average Marginal Effects, and p-values are reported; Robust Standard errors and Delta-method standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1. Trading Partner Joining Consultations 
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Figure 2. Dispute Outcome  
 
 
 
 
